03-20-2003, 06:20 PM
I expect some dissenting views to this, and am interested in opinions on how it looks from a non-emotional and different perspective than my own.
A precedent for the current action was set in Serbia, for 71 days, when NATO elected, without a UN Security Council Resolution, to bomb a sovreign natioin in pursuit of a political end, which aim was a better long term outcome vis a vis the troubles in the Balkans. The French were on board, the Germans, and I noted that the Russians, who have historic and ethnic ties to the Serbs, were unwilling to shoot a 'silver bullet' objection with the Americans due to
1) Milosevic being a jerk
2) they had other problems that warranted not going to full stop with the US over.
3) they did not get a vote
A sovreign right was exercised by a coalition of sovreign states, all of whom conveniently had a pre-existing treaty and military structure that made it easy to act. The immigration of Slavs into nice European neighborhoods was a security concern, as was the concern for either human rights, or the appearance that defending human rights was a good enough fig leaf to cover the real reasons behind the action!
Before you try to take me to task over that little shot: I spent three years briefing, once or twice per month, official NATO briefs to a variety of public audiences in which NATO's official public position to European security threats 'after the Bear' was proclaimed to include =and believe me the wording was minced to death= "water rights, water and food shortages, overpopulation, and large scale immigration." Security Threats, which NATO has realigned itself to address beyond Article 5 protections. While the briefs I gave were aimed at Northern Africa and the Mid East, particularly Turkey's neighbors and the Magreb, as the source of instability, it was striking to see how that logic was applied in re Former Yugoslavia. Also see the problems the Germans and Italians had with illegal Albanian, Croatian, etc. immigration. Milosevic's heavy handed policies made him an easy target, for sure, and even with 'success' the 'Peacekeepers' are STILL in Kosovo, Bosnia, ad nauseum. More on that point later.
Fast forward a few years and follow this precedent to where a coalition of sovreign states use UN Security Council actions from 1991 to 2002 (1441 being the latest in that litany) as a basis for action, and put together a plan of action to address a threat to regional stability, the region being on NATO's boundaries, as was Yugoslavia. But of course, the picture is a bit fuzzier, it is not just a NATO concern, and the past five month's rhetoric has exposed a variety of views on this case. No two cases are alike.
The French, who got a vote last time without a Security Council resolution, did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. Their right not to act is valid, all carping in Washington these days aside. The Russians did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. As well the Germans and Chinese, all of whom exercise their sovreign power to do what they think is right, to act or not to act.
I think that if you "follow the money" you will find that Serbia had nowhere near the economic importance of Iraq. Every government of the Western Model, and some not so inclined, gets its ear bent by businesses. This makes sense, as they are part of the government's constituency. So I am not surprised that French, German, Russian, and other businesses are voicing their concerns, powerfully, to their governments. They see a risk of loss, which could influence unemployment, etc.
There may be the fear among German, Dutch, French, and maybe even a few American, businesses that there is an audit trail to enabling Saddam's Gas/Germ/Nuke programs that will lead to them. The audit trail to Iran on such matters is no secret to some; it would not surprise me if the same was true in Iraq. William Safire, in the NY Times, outlined a recently reported and telling trail from China via France to Iraq on some shipments of chemicals that are banned under UN decrees. Here is where some American voices express disappointment in lack of collective UN action, and argue that it is an Ostrich like approach.
Of what worth is a law, they argue, or a UN decree, if it is not enforced? That question the opponents of the current action have not, to my view, answered with any merit. Be that as it may, each point of view has been presented over and over for some time now. Those who charge that the US did not lead this latest effort well can compare the current Administration with the administration in 1991 and make some points there about leading an international coalition into action. Funnily enough, there is an international coalition in action, of some 30 or so sovreign nations.
The coalition that is acting is far more diverse than the NATO alliance, of course, and includes some VERY interesting players. (to me)
Iceland (They have no military forces to speak of. NATO member.)
Azerbaijan
Spain (Main area of support appears to be, like what I hear from Canada, post conflict humanitarian support of the Iraqi populace)
Australia
Camaroon
Netherlands
Italy
Uzbekistan (I think I recall them being on the list)
Saudi Arabia (no surprise)
Qatar (ditto)
There are more.
Is the absence of the French and Russians significant? Short term, no, long term, yes. Ego bruising and all that aside, the attempts for the past 14 years to create a more cohesive, not less cohesive, North Atlantic collective security structure, which includes the Russians, may be harmed by the current action. We shall see.
What I find interesting is the rhetoric that this action is somehow "incorrect" yet the bombing of Serbia was "correct." Saddam is as big a jerk as Milosevic, possibly bigger, and his country has an economic impact on an entire region, possibly even on the whole world, that dwarfs the influence of Serbia. In fact, Serbia only had any impact on some parts of Europe, and early on made plenty of moves that were not the least bit subtle. Saddam at least is a bit cleverer than Milosevic, and has more leverage with many multinational concerns that boil down to real money, which interests many governments who find economic element germane in determining their national courses of action.
A good arguement can be made that Serbia and Iraq are not identical issues, of course, since Milosevic was continuing in his skullduggery, be it overt or covert, which claim could be made in re Iraq, but apparently has not been made to the international diplomatic-media-complex attendant lack of real risk for corrective action presented to calm all fears.
Even though the problems are NOT identical, they are similar, and I have to ask:
Is it only acceptable to act collectively if local European security is the issue, and when there is little risk?
That is the cynical message I am getting from Paris and Berlin. If the role of bully/strongman can be played by everyone without internal political fluff against a country who is completely unable to act effectively, is that the sole criterion for collective action?
When there is no substantial risk? See also Haiti under Cedras, as regards return of Aristide.
If the stakes and risks are high enough, does that mean that inaction is the only course of action? Such a point of view strikes me as 'enabling behaviour.' The 'International Community' can be easily bluffed.
But that does not answer the critical question of collective security: is the UN, NATO, or any other international body to act only if it is a 'sure thing'? The U.S. or another wealthy nation/coalition such as France in some of the African troubles of late or NATO in re Yugoslavia, picks up much of the tab in any case.
In 1991, the UN, after massive prodding of Senior Pres Bush, acted collectively. The UN can act together, and with a will, see also Korea. Sainai and Cyprus peacekeeping missions continune, a self licking ice cream cone that has to sustain since departure of the peacekeepers is assumed, at present, to be a signal that hostilities will recommence. Peacekeeping is a Bandaid on a deep wound, in most places, though it is a collective action that can help create stability for a price. Yet some sort of peacekeeping force, or effort, seems to be in offing in post conflict Iraq. Is that the sole role the UN can and will play?
In any collective security action, some one, and it is NOT the Secretary General, has to act as the leader. (Is the Congo 1962 'UN pure?' Hmmm, need to look that one up) That single contemporary issue, which grew in importance when Boutros-Boutros Ghali lost American support, is a telling detail that "the UN as the only authority" folks forget insofar as the practical application of how the UN really gets anything done. It took sovreign nations to lead a coalition, as none of the UN members abdicate sovreignty upon joining the UN, so no Secretary General could by structure, even if he wanted to, lead the way. He can only use suasion of the gentlest means. His tools of force are at the mercy of their parent nations should they choose to recall them. He is almost powerless, in reality.
Which brings me to models of power. There is a current model that any nation state or international actor has four elements of political power
Diplomatic
Economic
Military/Force
Informational
Of the four, I suggest that diplomacy may be a false source of power, as it is enabled by the other three. When you have nothing backing up your negotiating position, be it force, economics, or information (in which area I put excellent ideas like the furthering of human rights) then it can boil down to a lot of wind. Diplomats can be skilled deal makers, but they have to have something to work with. See the other three elements of power. Those who argue that diplomacy is not a paper tiger may be correct, in that sometimes the process of sitting down and talking out differences presents a 'third way' or an area for compromise that two previously opposed sides would not have seen without engaging into dialogue. (Good example: Turkey and Greece just being in NATO together forced dialogue and they have not gone to war. I am sure there are other better examples) But dialogue, like force, has its own limits. See Israel/Palestein. Thus, the UN Secretary General, whose most precious tool is continued dialogue, has limits to his influence.
So who will lead, who will act, when action is warranted? Someone leading a sovreign nation has cajoled some 30 or more sovreign nations to act together in an effort to enhance long term security in the Middle East. The risk is that this action will have quite the opposite effect.
OPEC has already announced that producing nations, I saw this on the news last night, will ensure that world oil supply will remain stable. This points to two issues: oil is not the issue short term. There is enough out there with or without Iraq's reserves being pumped out of the ground, a long term concern for all producers.
So why the hesitation to act?
I see that fear is the prime issue, and a reluctance to admit that the way the world still works is in too many cases: might makes right. I may be reading this wrongly, but about 300+ years of enforcement of "freedom of the high seas" by various national navies tells me that I am at least partly right. Back to 'might makes right,' see bombing Serbia, and the various armed peacekeeping operations in the name of the UN. If peacekeepers did not need arms to do their job . . . would they even be useful or necessary? Armed force ushers in more variables, and creates more Chance in any geopolitical endeavour. The increasing of Chance makes many people uncomfortable, as the outcome is very uncertain, per my comments in the post "Be careful what you wish for."
Unwillingness to risk is a common theme, and I confess that I do not understand all of the subtle reasons of all the players who are not willing to risk more than a certain amount. But 30 or more nations are willing to risk that use of force can make a better long term outcome, just as 16 nations risked the same in Serbia.
Has this risk aversion been addressed effectively?
Truman risked war with USSR and China when he went to the aid of South Korea. Having watched both Messrs Blair and Straw for the last two weeks as they addressed the House of Commons, the answer is yes, in some cases. A good deal of the rhetoric on the American side has, in the words of ex-UK Foreign Minister Portillo, been an obstacle to the success of the diplomatic moves of the past year of so. Inelegant for sure, and very direct. And if Information is an element of power, as the model suggests, why does it appear that a lesser effort has been applied in that area? A good question, or merely a matter of style.
One might even say that the American message has been too clear and too simple for the clever and subtle minds of the international, including American, intelligensia. Even as straightforward a man as Secretary Powell has doubtless winced now and again at official utterances.
Imperfections aside, my question remains: is the objection and rhetoric against the current course of action really about "follow the money;" is it about "lack of style;" or is it about fear, and an unwillingness to risk for a future gain?
I think it is risk aversion first, money a close second, and style a distant third.
Kennedy risked in Cuba, and won, he risked in Viet Nam, and did not do quite so well. (Ask LBJ about being dealt that hand... oops, he's dead too.)
Thatcher risked in the Falklands, and won.
Bush, Sr, risked in Kuwait/Iraq, and succeeded.
Bush and Clinton both risked in Somalia, which move ran into a mess.
Lech Walesa risked in Poland, and won
The Slovenes risked versus Serbia, and won
Milosevic risked in Bosnia, and lost. Big.
Gorbachev risked with Peristroyka, and if not a real win or a lose outcome, he made a huge change in the world. As I see it, he helped preclude a nuclear WW III . . . for a while.
He who will not risk cannot win, says John Paul Jones, and more importantly, he who will not risk cannot change that which needs changing.
A precedent for the current action was set in Serbia, for 71 days, when NATO elected, without a UN Security Council Resolution, to bomb a sovreign natioin in pursuit of a political end, which aim was a better long term outcome vis a vis the troubles in the Balkans. The French were on board, the Germans, and I noted that the Russians, who have historic and ethnic ties to the Serbs, were unwilling to shoot a 'silver bullet' objection with the Americans due to
1) Milosevic being a jerk
2) they had other problems that warranted not going to full stop with the US over.
3) they did not get a vote
A sovreign right was exercised by a coalition of sovreign states, all of whom conveniently had a pre-existing treaty and military structure that made it easy to act. The immigration of Slavs into nice European neighborhoods was a security concern, as was the concern for either human rights, or the appearance that defending human rights was a good enough fig leaf to cover the real reasons behind the action!
Before you try to take me to task over that little shot: I spent three years briefing, once or twice per month, official NATO briefs to a variety of public audiences in which NATO's official public position to European security threats 'after the Bear' was proclaimed to include =and believe me the wording was minced to death= "water rights, water and food shortages, overpopulation, and large scale immigration." Security Threats, which NATO has realigned itself to address beyond Article 5 protections. While the briefs I gave were aimed at Northern Africa and the Mid East, particularly Turkey's neighbors and the Magreb, as the source of instability, it was striking to see how that logic was applied in re Former Yugoslavia. Also see the problems the Germans and Italians had with illegal Albanian, Croatian, etc. immigration. Milosevic's heavy handed policies made him an easy target, for sure, and even with 'success' the 'Peacekeepers' are STILL in Kosovo, Bosnia, ad nauseum. More on that point later.
Fast forward a few years and follow this precedent to where a coalition of sovreign states use UN Security Council actions from 1991 to 2002 (1441 being the latest in that litany) as a basis for action, and put together a plan of action to address a threat to regional stability, the region being on NATO's boundaries, as was Yugoslavia. But of course, the picture is a bit fuzzier, it is not just a NATO concern, and the past five month's rhetoric has exposed a variety of views on this case. No two cases are alike.
The French, who got a vote last time without a Security Council resolution, did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. Their right not to act is valid, all carping in Washington these days aside. The Russians did not want to play for their own sovreign reasons. As well the Germans and Chinese, all of whom exercise their sovreign power to do what they think is right, to act or not to act.
I think that if you "follow the money" you will find that Serbia had nowhere near the economic importance of Iraq. Every government of the Western Model, and some not so inclined, gets its ear bent by businesses. This makes sense, as they are part of the government's constituency. So I am not surprised that French, German, Russian, and other businesses are voicing their concerns, powerfully, to their governments. They see a risk of loss, which could influence unemployment, etc.
There may be the fear among German, Dutch, French, and maybe even a few American, businesses that there is an audit trail to enabling Saddam's Gas/Germ/Nuke programs that will lead to them. The audit trail to Iran on such matters is no secret to some; it would not surprise me if the same was true in Iraq. William Safire, in the NY Times, outlined a recently reported and telling trail from China via France to Iraq on some shipments of chemicals that are banned under UN decrees. Here is where some American voices express disappointment in lack of collective UN action, and argue that it is an Ostrich like approach.
Of what worth is a law, they argue, or a UN decree, if it is not enforced? That question the opponents of the current action have not, to my view, answered with any merit. Be that as it may, each point of view has been presented over and over for some time now. Those who charge that the US did not lead this latest effort well can compare the current Administration with the administration in 1991 and make some points there about leading an international coalition into action. Funnily enough, there is an international coalition in action, of some 30 or so sovreign nations.
The coalition that is acting is far more diverse than the NATO alliance, of course, and includes some VERY interesting players. (to me)
Iceland (They have no military forces to speak of. NATO member.)
Azerbaijan
Spain (Main area of support appears to be, like what I hear from Canada, post conflict humanitarian support of the Iraqi populace)
Australia
Camaroon
Netherlands
Italy
Uzbekistan (I think I recall them being on the list)
Saudi Arabia (no surprise)
Qatar (ditto)
There are more.
Is the absence of the French and Russians significant? Short term, no, long term, yes. Ego bruising and all that aside, the attempts for the past 14 years to create a more cohesive, not less cohesive, North Atlantic collective security structure, which includes the Russians, may be harmed by the current action. We shall see.
What I find interesting is the rhetoric that this action is somehow "incorrect" yet the bombing of Serbia was "correct." Saddam is as big a jerk as Milosevic, possibly bigger, and his country has an economic impact on an entire region, possibly even on the whole world, that dwarfs the influence of Serbia. In fact, Serbia only had any impact on some parts of Europe, and early on made plenty of moves that were not the least bit subtle. Saddam at least is a bit cleverer than Milosevic, and has more leverage with many multinational concerns that boil down to real money, which interests many governments who find economic element germane in determining their national courses of action.
A good arguement can be made that Serbia and Iraq are not identical issues, of course, since Milosevic was continuing in his skullduggery, be it overt or covert, which claim could be made in re Iraq, but apparently has not been made to the international diplomatic-media-complex attendant lack of real risk for corrective action presented to calm all fears.
Even though the problems are NOT identical, they are similar, and I have to ask:
Is it only acceptable to act collectively if local European security is the issue, and when there is little risk?
That is the cynical message I am getting from Paris and Berlin. If the role of bully/strongman can be played by everyone without internal political fluff against a country who is completely unable to act effectively, is that the sole criterion for collective action?
When there is no substantial risk? See also Haiti under Cedras, as regards return of Aristide.
If the stakes and risks are high enough, does that mean that inaction is the only course of action? Such a point of view strikes me as 'enabling behaviour.' The 'International Community' can be easily bluffed.
But that does not answer the critical question of collective security: is the UN, NATO, or any other international body to act only if it is a 'sure thing'? The U.S. or another wealthy nation/coalition such as France in some of the African troubles of late or NATO in re Yugoslavia, picks up much of the tab in any case.
In 1991, the UN, after massive prodding of Senior Pres Bush, acted collectively. The UN can act together, and with a will, see also Korea. Sainai and Cyprus peacekeeping missions continune, a self licking ice cream cone that has to sustain since departure of the peacekeepers is assumed, at present, to be a signal that hostilities will recommence. Peacekeeping is a Bandaid on a deep wound, in most places, though it is a collective action that can help create stability for a price. Yet some sort of peacekeeping force, or effort, seems to be in offing in post conflict Iraq. Is that the sole role the UN can and will play?
In any collective security action, some one, and it is NOT the Secretary General, has to act as the leader. (Is the Congo 1962 'UN pure?' Hmmm, need to look that one up) That single contemporary issue, which grew in importance when Boutros-Boutros Ghali lost American support, is a telling detail that "the UN as the only authority" folks forget insofar as the practical application of how the UN really gets anything done. It took sovreign nations to lead a coalition, as none of the UN members abdicate sovreignty upon joining the UN, so no Secretary General could by structure, even if he wanted to, lead the way. He can only use suasion of the gentlest means. His tools of force are at the mercy of their parent nations should they choose to recall them. He is almost powerless, in reality.
Which brings me to models of power. There is a current model that any nation state or international actor has four elements of political power
Diplomatic
Economic
Military/Force
Informational
Of the four, I suggest that diplomacy may be a false source of power, as it is enabled by the other three. When you have nothing backing up your negotiating position, be it force, economics, or information (in which area I put excellent ideas like the furthering of human rights) then it can boil down to a lot of wind. Diplomats can be skilled deal makers, but they have to have something to work with. See the other three elements of power. Those who argue that diplomacy is not a paper tiger may be correct, in that sometimes the process of sitting down and talking out differences presents a 'third way' or an area for compromise that two previously opposed sides would not have seen without engaging into dialogue. (Good example: Turkey and Greece just being in NATO together forced dialogue and they have not gone to war. I am sure there are other better examples) But dialogue, like force, has its own limits. See Israel/Palestein. Thus, the UN Secretary General, whose most precious tool is continued dialogue, has limits to his influence.
So who will lead, who will act, when action is warranted? Someone leading a sovreign nation has cajoled some 30 or more sovreign nations to act together in an effort to enhance long term security in the Middle East. The risk is that this action will have quite the opposite effect.
OPEC has already announced that producing nations, I saw this on the news last night, will ensure that world oil supply will remain stable. This points to two issues: oil is not the issue short term. There is enough out there with or without Iraq's reserves being pumped out of the ground, a long term concern for all producers.
So why the hesitation to act?
I see that fear is the prime issue, and a reluctance to admit that the way the world still works is in too many cases: might makes right. I may be reading this wrongly, but about 300+ years of enforcement of "freedom of the high seas" by various national navies tells me that I am at least partly right. Back to 'might makes right,' see bombing Serbia, and the various armed peacekeeping operations in the name of the UN. If peacekeepers did not need arms to do their job . . . would they even be useful or necessary? Armed force ushers in more variables, and creates more Chance in any geopolitical endeavour. The increasing of Chance makes many people uncomfortable, as the outcome is very uncertain, per my comments in the post "Be careful what you wish for."
Unwillingness to risk is a common theme, and I confess that I do not understand all of the subtle reasons of all the players who are not willing to risk more than a certain amount. But 30 or more nations are willing to risk that use of force can make a better long term outcome, just as 16 nations risked the same in Serbia.
Has this risk aversion been addressed effectively?
Truman risked war with USSR and China when he went to the aid of South Korea. Having watched both Messrs Blair and Straw for the last two weeks as they addressed the House of Commons, the answer is yes, in some cases. A good deal of the rhetoric on the American side has, in the words of ex-UK Foreign Minister Portillo, been an obstacle to the success of the diplomatic moves of the past year of so. Inelegant for sure, and very direct. And if Information is an element of power, as the model suggests, why does it appear that a lesser effort has been applied in that area? A good question, or merely a matter of style.
One might even say that the American message has been too clear and too simple for the clever and subtle minds of the international, including American, intelligensia. Even as straightforward a man as Secretary Powell has doubtless winced now and again at official utterances.
Imperfections aside, my question remains: is the objection and rhetoric against the current course of action really about "follow the money;" is it about "lack of style;" or is it about fear, and an unwillingness to risk for a future gain?
I think it is risk aversion first, money a close second, and style a distant third.
Kennedy risked in Cuba, and won, he risked in Viet Nam, and did not do quite so well. (Ask LBJ about being dealt that hand... oops, he's dead too.)
Thatcher risked in the Falklands, and won.
Bush, Sr, risked in Kuwait/Iraq, and succeeded.
Bush and Clinton both risked in Somalia, which move ran into a mess.
Lech Walesa risked in Poland, and won
The Slovenes risked versus Serbia, and won
Milosevic risked in Bosnia, and lost. Big.
Gorbachev risked with Peristroyka, and if not a real win or a lose outcome, he made a huge change in the world. As I see it, he helped preclude a nuclear WW III . . . for a while.
He who will not risk cannot win, says John Paul Jones, and more importantly, he who will not risk cannot change that which needs changing.
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete