02-21-2003, 04:29 PM
(This post was last modified: 02-21-2003, 04:40 PM by Occhidiangela.)
1. Martyrdom is a tried and true way of making a point. A man called Jesus used it, and others before him. It has been used to good effect by Islamics for centuries, and I am sure the historians here could come up with more examples of the effect martyrdom can have in other cultures. If the Human Shields want to be martyrs, so be it. It is a calculated political risk they are willing to take, and whether or not their bluff is called depends on how much political risk the Allied forces are willing to accept. We shall see. War being a child of politics, the media being a feature of war, and martyrdom being best used on screen these days, it is simply part of the environment of conflict. Anyone remember the Bhuddist monk who set himself on fire back in the 1960's in Viet Nam? That act spoke volumes, as it got captured by the international media, which I believe was his objective.
2. About fratricide. The blue on blue engagements, such as the British armored vehicles in 1991, the Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan recently, the American Bradley Fighting Vehicle that got waxed by an Apache Hellfire Missile in 1991, and for that matter, the two US Blackhawks that got shot down by US F-15's over NOrthern Iraq a few years later, are all evidence of the fact that war, and the application of deadly force, is a human endeavour and subject to error. Warblade can try to attribute malice to a case of error, and will be mistaken.
To understand fratricide, one should look at the B-24 raid in Normandy in 1944 that killed over 200 American soldiers, including three star General Wesley McNair. An error in flight path, a little wind, a non doctrinal approach to the lines, a high altitude bombing raid planned as CLose Air Support, and a spotting error all contributed to tons of bombs falling on the wrong side of the line.
If anyone expects zero defects when dropping bombs, they are asking for a measure of perfection not yet attainable in a human endeavour. Most of the recent fratricide events are directly traceable to explicit procedural errors, and most importantly to failures in communication. The Canadians in Afghanistan is a good example of that. Errors in communication is a human norm.
Soldiers go in harms way: it comes with th badge. Until anyone can come up with an effective method to guarantee zero defects, some will occasionally die to "friendly fire" when the shooting starts. The modern battlefield, as lethal as it is, has a remarkably low Friendly Fire incidence rate. Of course, if you happen to the guy who gets hit, it sucks royally.
3. Collateral damage. The American Media and the US Air Force did a great job of selling precision weapons as some silver bullet during the GUlf War II (1991). As far as I am concerned, it was one of the worst snow jobs in history. When things blow up, stuff flies everywhere. When things blow up in a city where people live, things and people who are not primary targets will often get hit. That is the nature of warfare conducted with modern weapons. What has changed is that in order to hit a particular target, like a commmand center, it takes one or two bombs, whereas even as recently as Viet Nam, it would take plane loads of bombs to cover a few city blocks in hopes of hitting a particular building. That sort of collateral damage is a thing of the past.
4. Pure error. The bombed French Embassy in 1986, Lybia and the bombed Chinese Embassy Belgrade 1999. Here are errors in targeting that perplex me, particularly the 1999 bombing when precision weapons made up a huge majority of ordnance in the air attacks. It still boils down to errors in either intelligence, as in the grid coordinates of proper targets, or errors in application of the armed aircraft. However, if you look at the Operation Dorado canyon in 1986 and the 71 day bombing of Belgrade in 1999, you will still find that, per sortie flown, the error rate is well below 1%. Try duplicating that in most any other endeavour. And with such a low real error rate, it is inane to ask that one not undertake a course of action for fear that some one might make a mistake. Try applying that logic to any other human endeavour, and one might find out how ludicrous that is. "I ought not drive to the grocery store, as someone might run the red light and T-bone me." Bah.
The emotional foaming at the mouth about civilian casualties in Iraq 1991 is preposterous: placing civilians in command centers makes them a target, and oh by the way, violates the Geneva accords in regards to non-combatants. The US, and every NATO nation's doctrine and explicit political goal is to minimize avoidbale casualties of non-combatants. Considering how far we have come from 1945 to present, that goal has been achieved in spades.
For all of the zero defects mavens out there, (not you Rhydd): go find a Utopia somewhere to apply your logic in. The rest of us will continue to live here on planet Earth, that home to human imperfection.
2. About fratricide. The blue on blue engagements, such as the British armored vehicles in 1991, the Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan recently, the American Bradley Fighting Vehicle that got waxed by an Apache Hellfire Missile in 1991, and for that matter, the two US Blackhawks that got shot down by US F-15's over NOrthern Iraq a few years later, are all evidence of the fact that war, and the application of deadly force, is a human endeavour and subject to error. Warblade can try to attribute malice to a case of error, and will be mistaken.
To understand fratricide, one should look at the B-24 raid in Normandy in 1944 that killed over 200 American soldiers, including three star General Wesley McNair. An error in flight path, a little wind, a non doctrinal approach to the lines, a high altitude bombing raid planned as CLose Air Support, and a spotting error all contributed to tons of bombs falling on the wrong side of the line.
If anyone expects zero defects when dropping bombs, they are asking for a measure of perfection not yet attainable in a human endeavour. Most of the recent fratricide events are directly traceable to explicit procedural errors, and most importantly to failures in communication. The Canadians in Afghanistan is a good example of that. Errors in communication is a human norm.
Soldiers go in harms way: it comes with th badge. Until anyone can come up with an effective method to guarantee zero defects, some will occasionally die to "friendly fire" when the shooting starts. The modern battlefield, as lethal as it is, has a remarkably low Friendly Fire incidence rate. Of course, if you happen to the guy who gets hit, it sucks royally.
3. Collateral damage. The American Media and the US Air Force did a great job of selling precision weapons as some silver bullet during the GUlf War II (1991). As far as I am concerned, it was one of the worst snow jobs in history. When things blow up, stuff flies everywhere. When things blow up in a city where people live, things and people who are not primary targets will often get hit. That is the nature of warfare conducted with modern weapons. What has changed is that in order to hit a particular target, like a commmand center, it takes one or two bombs, whereas even as recently as Viet Nam, it would take plane loads of bombs to cover a few city blocks in hopes of hitting a particular building. That sort of collateral damage is a thing of the past.
4. Pure error. The bombed French Embassy in 1986, Lybia and the bombed Chinese Embassy Belgrade 1999. Here are errors in targeting that perplex me, particularly the 1999 bombing when precision weapons made up a huge majority of ordnance in the air attacks. It still boils down to errors in either intelligence, as in the grid coordinates of proper targets, or errors in application of the armed aircraft. However, if you look at the Operation Dorado canyon in 1986 and the 71 day bombing of Belgrade in 1999, you will still find that, per sortie flown, the error rate is well below 1%. Try duplicating that in most any other endeavour. And with such a low real error rate, it is inane to ask that one not undertake a course of action for fear that some one might make a mistake. Try applying that logic to any other human endeavour, and one might find out how ludicrous that is. "I ought not drive to the grocery store, as someone might run the red light and T-bone me." Bah.
The emotional foaming at the mouth about civilian casualties in Iraq 1991 is preposterous: placing civilians in command centers makes them a target, and oh by the way, violates the Geneva accords in regards to non-combatants. The US, and every NATO nation's doctrine and explicit political goal is to minimize avoidbale casualties of non-combatants. Considering how far we have come from 1945 to present, that goal has been achieved in spades.
For all of the zero defects mavens out there, (not you Rhydd): go find a Utopia somewhere to apply your logic in. The rest of us will continue to live here on planet Earth, that home to human imperfection.
Cry 'Havoc' and let slip the Men 'O War!
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete
In War, the outcome is never final. --Carl von Clausewitz--
Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum
John 11:35 - consider why.
In Memory of Pete