ACORN

[--Pete]

Hi,

I don´t think this is the biggest problem if everybody can just register himself several times. As I said before, if this is so easy, now way ACORN would be the only ones doing it.

First, it is not easy to register multiple times. We are not quite the nation of idiots you make us out to be. Nor are we the nation of criminals you seem to think we are. Most (and by that I mean just about all) the people in the USA would only vote once even if it were as easy as you think to vote multiple times.

In Holland almost all voting stations used computers until the populists started saying that you can fiddle with them and thus they were not 'safe'.

Glad to hear that you have some smart people there. Consider: an organization might be able to fix a few thousand, maybe a few tens of thousands, of votes, max. But if you do all your voting electronically, then one person with the right knowledge and access can fix *all* the votes. There isn't enough knowledge about voting machines, yet, but we can take a lesson from gambling machines. See this for one especially notorious case and this for a discussion of some of the failings of the present system.

You are right do about the fraud thing...it is not much of a fraud if everybody can see what happens.

But it can be big enough. Many people are unobservant. They'll hit the 'submit' button without checking what the machine actually shows. Even if it is only one in ten, it can be more than enough to change the outcome of a close election.

I actually think it should be not a big problem to use computer.
Have them prepared and checked at a well maintained impartial site.

That would be a good start, in theory. However, how do you determine that a site is impartial. In the case of gambling machines, the state gaming commission employees are not permitted to gamble, which helps. But in the case of voting machines, do you hire immigrants? Where do you find non-partisan workers? It is the old 'who guards the guardians' problem.

Send all the computers ´blind´ to the places they are used.

Probably more useful in a place where there are more than two major parties. But with only two, if all the machines are fixed at the source, then the 'blind' distribution doesn't help.

Besides, you are overlooking the fact that this election isn't just a presidential election. In addition to the president, I will be voting for a member of the house of representatives (this is a bye year for senators in Washington), for state governor, for eight other state wide offices, for eight judges at various levels, for two district representatives (state legislature), for three state initiatives, for eight county charter amendments, and for a special district proposition. While not on this particular ballot, in times passed there have also been city officials, school board officials, school levies, and other local issues on the ballot. Which means that either the machines must be set up for the district they are going to be used in, eliminating the 'blind' possibility or they must be set up at the district level, opening the door for rigging at that level.

Connect them to a second computer, combine the numbers people are given when entering a voting station with those in the computer...encrypt all of this so that you can't quickly see who voted what etc. etc.

This is muddled. Are you looking to prevent voter fraud by the voters or prevent voter fraud by the people who have access to the machines? If the first, once a valid registration has been obtained, I don't see how this helps. If the second, if the machine changes the vote internally before all the hocus-pocus you suggest, what good does the rest do? The fraud has been committed and there is no way to undo it.

Many voting station have less then a 1000 people using it (is that right) so rigging all of them would be a lot of trouble to go through.

Not really. Most personal computers are only used by one person, yet a virus can still effect millions. Same principle. The effort is writing the code in the first place. Putting it into thousands of voting machines is simple, especially if done at the source of the machine or if incorporated into the program that sets up the machines for the district.

I think the probability and the cause of rigging voting machine can be minimized to acceptable levels (almost 0) without too many problems. (think about testing them before voting starts etc.)

OK, but where do I get the test code and who does the testing? Look back at the link to the gaming machines. It was precisely through the test code that the scam was introduced. So, your suggestion for a security measure turns out to be an additional security loophole.

The people who really understand this problem are pretty well in agreement that with the present infrastructure and technology no paperless electronic voting system is secure. This article does a good job of outlining the problem. Be sure to read the comments as well as the article, and possibly follow some of the links.

I'm glad electronic voting works in Holland, or at least I'm glad you think it does. But that is still not enough for me to support it here.

--Pete