Should civilized nations use "Enhanced Interrogation" techni

[Occhidiangela]

Hi,

I'm going to ask you the same questions that I've been harping on with kandrathe. What are the objectives of the US foreign policy (or, what should they be)? What tactics are best in achieving these objectives and what tactics are counterproductive? Given that I consider your background and knowledge on this subject the best of anyone I know personally or online, I'd really like your input -- but, hey, no pressure:)

--Pete

Pete, please forgive the late reply. I don't visit the Lounge each day.

The question you ask, at this point, is very tough to answer. I will ponder it a bit, and try to give you a quality reply. Part of the current problem is the need to both do things for the future goals and aims, and undo some horrific damage due to badly pursued aims over about five years.

So, the three points are:

What are the objectives of the US foreign policy (or, what should they be)?
What tactics are best in achieving these objectives

and

what tactics are counterproductive?

I can answer the last very briefly, but incompletely: self delusion as a method is of course wrong (see "Iraq will pay for its own reconstruction in threeto five years with oil revenue" among others as well as "we don't do nation building, even when we need to in order to achieve an aim" for another.)

Trying to fight a war on a thin margin (how little can we get away with committing? ) , versus the Powell Doctrines' Go Big or Go Home -- bad methodology. It is the root cause of the details in execution going horribly wrong from the get go -- see Garner's unresourced nation building mission, and Bermmer's disaster.

To give you my personal insight on part of that from the purely tactical view: when I was over there in 2004, we were during the middle of the summer getting SEC DEF level inquiries on how soon we could scale back air ops, and bring at least on strike squadron and a C-130 squadron home. Mid 2004, mind you. It seems that from a bean counter's perspective, our footprint was too large and too expensive. (BUt they could afford to ship Mr Greenbeans gourment coffee in convoys to as many base areas as could be stood up. Nuts, I tell you.)

War on the cheap, somewhat.

This "there are too many of you over there" was being asserted in DC when the briefs from field commanders, the standard stop light briefs, (Green good, amber needs help, red means ugh, it's a mess) in the Circle of Fire around Baghdad, were all amber and red.

Nearly no green lights. Rummy really didn't grasp what was needed to achieve the political aim, and his generals, Abizaid and others, had basically been told "don't ask for more, you won't get it."

But let me think a bit, and take things in order, to assess aims and means.

It is no small question you ask, Pete.:)

Occhi